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THE ENFORCEMENT LOOPHOLE:
JUDGMENT-RECOGNITION DEFENSES AS A LOOPHOLE TO
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CONDUCT ABROAD
INTRODUCTION
After a major oil spill such as the most recent one in the Gulf of Mexico,
many are left with a lingering question: will the contaminator be held
accountable? Yet, despite the breadth of news coverage in 2010 focusing on
BP, the oil contamination in the Gulf pales in comparison to the “Amazon
Chernobyl,” commonly regarded as the worst oil contamination in history.1
The “Amazon Chernobyl” refers to the oil contamination suffered in Ecuador
and Peru due to the dumping of billions of gallons of waste byproduct from
drilling into the rivers and streams of the Amazon.2 After eighteen years of
litigation and an $8.6 billion judgment against Chevron, the Amazon
Chernobyl is now not only the world’s worst oil contamination, but it has also
led to the largest judgment ever issued in an environmental case.3
Texaco began drilling in the eastern areas of Ecuador in 1964.4 For
approximately twenty-six years, Texaco allegedly contributed to the Amazon
Chernobyl by dumping over sixteen billion gallons of toxic waste from its oil
wells into streams and rivers that thousands of people relied on for drinking
water.5 In addition to causing widespread contamination in an area equal to the
size of Rhode Island, cancers and other oil-related medical problems continue
to plague the indigenous population.6 Yet, after Chevron purchased Texaco in

1

Bob Herbert, Disaster in the Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/
opinion/05herbert.html.
2 Amazon Defense Coalition, Chevron CEO’s Legacy Marred by Mishandling of Ecuador
Environmental Crisis, BIOTECH WEEK, Oct. 14, 2009.
3 Ben Casselman et al., Chevron Hit with Record Judgment, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703584804576144464044068664.html. The judgment also
conditionally granted punitive damages of an additional $8.6 million unless Chevron publicly apologized to
the plaintiffs within fifteen days of the judgment being issued. Id.
4 Human Rights Impacts of Oil Pollution: Ecuador, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.
business-humanrights.org/Documents/Oilpollution/Ecuador/Introduction (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
5 Complaint to Stay Arbitration at 3, Yaiguaje v. Chevron, Nos. 09 Civ. 9958, 10 Civ. 316 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 2010), 2010 WL 1028349 [hereinafter Yaiguaje Complaint].
6 Id. at 3, 7. According to one estimate by Daniel Rourke, up to 10,000 Ecuadorians are still at risk of
contracting cancer in the future in the areas where Texaco operated. Jonathan S. Abady, Chevron Should Pay
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2001, ChevronTexaco,7 the world’s fifth-largest corporation,8 has employed a
multitude of litigation strategies to avoid liability for Texaco’s role in the
environmental damages, which is estimated to be between $90 and $113
billion.9 It appears that from the beginning, Chevron never contemplated
compensation for the victims of Texaco’s contamination—Chevron allegedly
did not account for the pending litigation between Texaco and the residents of
the Amazonian rainforest when it agreed to purchase Texaco for $35 billion.10
The Chevron litigation drama began in 1994: approximately 30,000
affected residents of Ecuador and Peru brought a suit against Texaco before the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Aguinda v.
Texaco,11 alleging property damage, personal injuries, and increased risk of
disease due to “negligent or otherwise improper oil piping and waste disposal
practices.”12 Foreign plaintiffs typically prefer bringing suit in the United
States, as opposed to a foreign forum, because of the unique substantive and
procedural opportunities that are available in the United States.13 These
include, to name a few, damages for mental anguish, punitive damages, broad
discovery tools, and the right to a jury trial on issues of fact.14
In 2001, the court in Aguinda v. Texaco granted Texaco’s renewed motion
to dismiss the suit brought by the affected citizens under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens (“FNC”).15 The court undertook a detailed analysis to
determine whether Ecuador was an adequate alternative forum, one of the

for Its Pollution in Ecuador, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704116004575522301163187566.html.
7 Chevron changed its name to ChevronTexaco in 2001, but subsequently changed it back to Chevron in
2005. Human Rights Impacts of Oil Pollution: Ecuador, supra note 4.
8 Norman Lear, Was Oil Named ‘Crude’ Because of the Way Oil Companies Do Business?,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2010, 2:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/norman-lear/was-oil-namedcrude-becau_b_604741.html.
9 Michael D. Goldhaber, Year 18 of Ecuador vs. Chevron Pollution Suit, AM. L. DAILY BLOG (Sept. 23,
2010), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202472363613.
10 Amazon Defense Coalition, supra note 2. Given that Chevron paid an 18% premium on Texaco stock
and assumed approximately $8 billion of Texaco’s current debt in the purchase, it is hard to imagine that
Chevron ever intended to pay out $90 billion for Texaco’s role in the contamination. Chevron to Buy Texaco in
$35 Billion Deal, ABC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2000), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=89201&page=1.
11 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 534, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
12 Id. at 537.
13 Richard D. Freer, Refracting Domestic and Global Choice-of-Forum Doctrine Through the Lens of a
Single Case, 2007 BYU L. REV. 959, 971 (2007).
14 Id. at 971–72.
15 Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
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requirements to succeed on a motion to dismiss based on FNC.16 In opposing
the motion, the Aguinda plaintiffs provided evidence that “the Ecuadorian
courts were subject to corrupting influences and outside pressures, especially
from the military, that rendered them inadequate to dispense independent,
impartial justice in these cases.”17 Nonetheless, the court determined that
Ecuador was an adequate forum, still admitting that “no one claims the
Ecuadorian judiciary is wholly immune to corruption, inefficiency, or outside
pressure.”18 The court thus recognized the danger of corruption in the judiciary
of Ecuador, yet found that “the courts of Ecuador can exercise with respect to
the parties and claims here presented that modicum of independence and
impartiality necessary to an adequate alternative forum.”19
The Second Circuit in 2002 affirmed the district court’s dismissal under
FNC, holding that Ecuador was a suitable forum for both the plaintiffs from
Peru and the plaintiffs from Ecuador.20 In response to the Aguinda plaintiffs’
repeated arguments that Ecuadorian courts were subject to corruption and
impartiality, the Second Circuit found that the district court’s findings were not
an abuse of discretion.21
The practical effect of an FNC dismissal is significant: in the
overwhelming majority of cases, an FNC dismissal is a clear victory for
defendants because it forces plaintiffs to either settle for insignificant amounts
or abandon their efforts.22 Yet, against all odds, leaders of the affected
Amazonian communities persevered and filed suit in May 2003 against
Texaco, by then known as ChevronTexaco, in Lago Agrio, Ecuador.23
Despite litigating in its “preferred forum” in Lago Agrio, ChevronTexaco
has since invoked multiple proceedings outside of Ecuador in an attempt to
escape liability, including before the American Arbitration Association

16

Id. at 537, 539.
Id. at 543.
18 Id. at 544.
19 Id. at 545–46.
20 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). The court modified the judgment in one
respect by extending the period during which Texaco was required, as a condition to the dismissal, to waive
any defenses based on a statute of limitations. Id. at 478–79.
21 Id. at 478.
22 See Freer, supra note 13, at 974.
23 Cortelyou Kenney, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transactional Human
Rights Litigation, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 858–59 (2009) (reciting case history).
17
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(“AAA”).24 In the AAA proceeding, ChevronTexaco sought a declaration
releasing it from liability or, in the alternative, indemnification by the Republic
of Ecuador based on a May 1995 release agreement between Texaco and
Ecuadorian government agencies, which absolved the company of potential
liability in exchange for partial cleanup of contaminated sites.25 While a New
York district court ultimately granted a permanent stay of arbitration, one
commentator has argued that the fact that the proceedings even took place
“pose[d] significant risks to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs” because, despite the
similarities to the Lago Agrio litigation, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ interests
were not being represented in the attempted arbitration or the litigation.26
Back in Lago Agrio, the unending litigation has continued to unfold over
the past eight years. As the trial began to wind down, reports circulated that the
plaintiffs were finally going to be able to recover.27 Nonetheless, Chevron has
made it clear that it has no intention of backing down: in August 2009,
Chevron released on its website secretly taped videos demonstrating corrupt
activities involving the Lago Agrio litigation.28 Two men posing as
contractors29 took watches and pens implanted with recording devices into
24 Id. at 859. Chevron also instituted a proceeding before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Hague in 2009. Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Files International Arbitration Against the Government of
Ecuador Over Violations of the United States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.chevron.com/news/press/release/?id=2009-09-23. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Hague ruled in favor of Chevron. Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Wins Arbitration Claim Against the
Government of Ecuador: International Tribunal Awards Chevron Approximately $700 Million (Mar. 30,
2010), http://www.chevron.com/news/press/release/?id=2010-03-30.
25 Yaiguaje Complaint, supra note 5, at 4–5. According to ChevronTexaco, the contract obligated the
Republic of Ecuador to indemnify ChevronTexaco for the costs of any cleanup ordered by the Lago Agrio
court. Id. The Republic brought a motion to stay the AAA arbitration before a New York state court, and
ChevronTexaco removed the proceedings to federal court. Kenney, supra note 23, at 859.
26 Kenney, supra note 23, at 860.
27 See Amazon Defense Coalition, supra note 2. A court-appointed Special Master in Ecuador estimated
the value of Texaco’s liability to be $27.3 billion. Id. The plaintiffs subsequently submitted to the Lago Agrio
court a new damages recommendation of $90 billion and $113 billion. Goldhaber, supra note 9. On February
15, 2011, the Ecuadorian court rendered an $8.6 billion judgment against Chevron to clean up oil pollution in
the Amazon. Casselman et al., supra note 3.
28 Press Release, Chevron, Videos Reveal Serious Judicial Misconduct and Political Influence in Ecuador
Lawsuit (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.chevron.com/news/press/release/?id=2009-08-31.
29 While the two “undercover” contractors claimed to be unaffiliated with Chevron, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California issued a subpoena in September of 2010 for one of the
“undercover” contractors, Diego Borja, based on evidence that suggests Borja “was not an innocent third party
who just happened to learn of the alleged bribery scheme but rather was a long-time associate of Chevron
whom Chevron would pay for any favorable testimony.” Order Granting Republic of Ecuador’s Ex Parte
Application for the Issuance of a Subpoena, In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC),
2010 WL 3702427, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010). Since 2009, Chevron has paid and allegedly continues to
pay Borja a monthly stipend of at least $5000, in addition to paying numerous other expenses for Borja.
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meetings where they discussed an alleged bribery scheme with the Ecuadorian
Judge Juan Nuñez, who was presiding over the case, and a man named Patricio
Garcia, who represented himself to be an official of Ecuador’s ruling party.30
Now that the Aguinda plaintiffs’ fears of corruption have come to fruition, Don
Campbell, a Chevron spokesperson, revealed to the public Chevron’s strategy
for the ongoing litigation, now in its eighteenth year: “We’re not paying and
we’re going to fight this for years if not decades into the future.”31
This Comment analyzes the “enforcement loophole” that will enable
Chevron to fight enforcement of the Lago Agrio court’s judgment “for decades
into the future.”32 The enforcement loophole is the corporate defendant’s
practice of using the standard defenses to foreign country judgment recognition
available in the United States for an unintended purpose: to circumvent
accountability abroad. After obtaining an FNC dismissal to a foreign tribunal
where the corporate defendant has no major assets, the corporate defendant
then has the opportunity to tailor the foreign litigation so that it satisfies one of
the exceptions to recognition in the United States.33 As a result, even though
foreign-country judgments are generally recognized on nearly the same basis
as sister-state judgments,34 the enforcement exceptions afford corporate
defendants an opportunity to manipulate the foreign litigation so that the
foreign-country judgment is unenforceable in the United States.

Supplemental Memorandum of Law of Defendants Hugo Gerado Camacho Naranjo and Javier Piaguaje
Payaguaje in Further Opposition to Chevron Corporation’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at *5, Chevron
Corp. v. Donziger, No. 1:11-cv-00691-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2011).
30 Chevron, supra note 28. In one meeting, the two businessman sought assurances from Judge Nuñez
that the Chevron suit would generate business. Id. Judge Nuñez responded by stating his plan to rule against
Chevron and by claiming that the government would administer the funds for the remediation contracts. Id. In
another meeting without Judge Nuñez, the two businessmen discussed a bribery scheme with Garcia where
they would pay $3 million in exchange for the environmental remediation contracts: $1 million for the
government, $1 million for the judge, and $1 million for the plaintiffs. Id. Judge Nuñez has since recused
himself from the Lago Agrio proceedings. Angel Gonzalez & Ben Casselman, Chevron Plaintiffs Ask U.S.
ST.
J.
(Jan.
15,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
Court
for
Action,
WALL
SB10001424052748704363504575003153443151606.html.
31 Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S.: As Largest Environmental
Judgment on Record Looms, the Oil Company Reassures Shareholders It Won’t Pay, WALL ST. J. (July 21,
2009) [hereinafter Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S.], http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124804873580263085.html. After Chevron received its $8.6 billion Ecuadorian judgment on February 14,
2011, “the company vowed to appeal and said it won’t pay the fine or apologize as the judge demanded.”
Casselman et al., supra note 3.
32 Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S., supra note 31.
33 See infra Part II.
34 See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 391 (1962)
[hereinafter UFMJRA].
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In other words, current enforcement practice in the United States provides
corporate defendants with a last resort for avoiding accountability abroad. For
example, despite the Lago Agrio $8.6 billion judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor,
the plaintiffs’ recovery ultimately hinges on whether a court in a country where
Chevron has assets, such as the United States, will recognize and enforce the
judgment, because Chevron has no major assets in Ecuador.35 Thus, Chevron’s
goal is to convince a U.S. court not to recognize the judgment, and Chevron’s
documentation of corrupt activities involving the Lago Agrio litigation’s
former presiding judge appears to be a part of this goal.36 In the opinion of
Ecuador’s Attorney General, Washington Pesantez, “[i]t seems . . . that
Chevron’s strategy is to delegitimize the actions of our judges.”37 After all, if
Chevron is able to “delegitimize” the judiciary of Ecuador by conjuring
evidence that it does not provide a “‘system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice,’”38 the judgment will satisfy one of the
exceptions to judgment enforcement in the United States. Chevron will thus
have exploited the enforcement loophole, and a U.S. court will deny
recognition of the Ecuadorian judgment.39 As unpalatable or improbable as this
may sound, Chevron’s alleged behavior appears to be representative of
corporate litigation strategy in general, to avoid large judgment payouts for tort
actions abroad.40 Not only does this behavior prevent plaintiffs from
recovering any money for years, if ever, but the amount of litigation
surrounding such disputes wastes substantial amounts of money and judicial
resources.41

35 Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S., supra note 31. (“Chevron itself has never operated
in Ecuador, and Texaco pulled out in 1992, leaving behind almost no assets for the court to seize in case of a
judgment against the company.”).
36 Chevron, supra note 28.
37 Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Ecuador Oil Pollution Case Only Grows Murkier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2009, at A4.
38 Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
202 (1895)).
39 In fact, Chevron has already sought and obtained a preliminary injunction by a district court in the
Southern District of New York, barring plaintiffs from seeking enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment
outside of Ecuador. Opinion Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *125-26, Chevron v. Donziger, 11
Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011).
40 See, e.g., Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Walter W. Heiser,
Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry
and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 609, 619, 635
(2008).
41 See M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient is Forum Non
Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 38, 41–43 (2007).
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In Part I, this Comment discusses the background of judgment enforcement
in the United States, with an emphasis on the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act, adopted by a majority of the states in the United
States, and the defenses typically raised in judgment-enforcement proceedings.
Part II discusses how the current method of judgment enforcement hinders
corporate accountability by examining the many hurdles encountered by
foreign plaintiffs seeking recovery, and the prevalent corporate litigation
strategy in light of the enforcement loophole. Finally, Part III discusses a
proposed solution.
I. BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
While judgment recognition is dealt with on a statutory basis, courts often
rely on common-law notions in their analysis of the issues.42 This Part is
divided into five Subparts and outlines the current regime of judgment
enforcement in the United States. The first Subpart explores comity, a concept
heavily relied on by courts in determining whether to enforce a foreign country
judgment. The second Subpart discusses the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act and its various grounds for non-recognition, before
the third Subpart examines some of the approaches taken by courts in
interpreting judgment-recognition defenses. The fourth Subpart specifically
addresses the rise of the concept of “international due process” for interpreting
the requirement of due process in the international context. Finally, the fifth
Subpart addresses the use of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in judgmentenforcement proceedings where the defendant has previously obtained an FNC
dismissal in favor of the tribunal that issued the contested judgment.
A. Comity and Hilton v. Guyot
Historically, the general tendency of the United States was to regard
foreign country judgments as “relatively conclusive.”43 In Hilton v. Guyot,44
the Supreme Court modified this tendency by holding that if a country does not
regard American judgments as conclusive, then the United States will not
enforce that country’s judgments.45 This holding, known as the reciprocity
42

See, e.g., Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1489–91 (5th ed., 2010). “Relatively conclusive” meant that as
long as the foreign court had jurisdiction, the foreign country judgment was conclusive subject to a few
exceptions. Id.
44 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1985).
45 Id. at 228–29.
43
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doctrine, has largely been ignored by federal and state courts in favor of
treating foreign-country judgments similarly to sister-state judgments.46 A
sister-state judgment refers to any judgment, decree, or order by a court of
another state in the United States, as distinguished from a foreign-country
judgment, which refers to any judgment, decree, or order of a court of another
country.47
While the Court’s reciprocity doctrine did not gain popularity among the
lower courts, the Court’s definition of comity in Hilton did, and it is heavily
relied on in the context of foreign country judgment enforcement:48
‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
49
protection of its laws.

Comity thus reflects the general policy to maintain good relations with foreign
countries through respecting foreign country judgments, and courts have often
relied on the concept as support for enforcing foreign country judgments in the
United States.50 As for the actual law applied during the foreign-country
judgment’s U.S. enforcement proceeding, while the American Law Institute
has proposed a draft federal statute for foreign-country judgments,51 state law
currently applies, as discussed below.52
B. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
In response to concerns about U.S. judgments being recognized abroad and
about uniformity across states, thirty-two states in the United States have
currently adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
46 HAY ET AL., supra note 43, at 1491–93. The Court in Hilton was applying general federal common
law, and after the Court’s holding in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), general federal common
law no longer exists. Id. at 80. Therefore, during an enforcement proceeding, even for a federal court sitting in
diversity, the state law of the recognizing court applies and the reciprocity holding from Hilton is not binding.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
48 Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 794
(2004).
49 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64.
50 Rosen, supra note 48, at 794.
51 UFMJRA, supra note 34.
52 HAY ET AL., supra note 43, at 1491–93.

WESTON GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 10:58 AM

THE ENFORCEMENT LOOPHOLE

739

(“UFMJRA”) in some form,53 which renders foreign country judgments
enforceable on nearly the same basis as sister-state judgments.54 The hope is
that by enforcing foreign-country judgments at home on a consistent basis,
courts abroad will recognize U.S. judgments.55 Under UFMJRA, before a party
can enforce a foreign-country judgment in the United States, the party must
first seek to have the judgment recognized in the state where the party is
seeking enforcement.56 During the enforcement proceeding, the burden is
initially on the plaintiff to prove that “the judgment is final, conclusive, and
enforceable where rendered.”57 Once the plaintiff has satisfied this burden, the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish one of UFMJRA’s various grounds
for non-recognition.58 The three mandatory grounds for non-recognition in
Section 4(a) are:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
59
matter.

Section 4(b) of UFMJRA lists six discretionary grounds for non-recognition:
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not
receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable
him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action/claim for relief] on which the judgment
is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state;

53

UFMJRA, supra note 34. For a list of states that have enacted the UFMJRA, see Legislative Fact
Sheet–Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act (last visited Mar.
26, 2011).
54 UFMJRA defines “foreign judgment” as “any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery
of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in
matrimonial or family matters.” UFMJRA, supra note 34, § 1(2).
55 Id. § 1.
56 Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995) (discussing the standard for recognizing
foreign country judgments under UFMJRA).
57 Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (discussing the standard for
recognizing foreign-country judgments under UFMJRA).
58 UFMJRA, supra note 34, § 6.
59 Id. § 4(a)(1)–(3).
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(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an
agreement between the parties under which the dispute in
question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in
that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service,
the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the
60
trial of the action.

UFMJRA was revised in 2005 under the title “Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act.”61 Because most states have adopted some
variety of the UFMJRA, this Comment focuses on the judgment-enforcement
issues encountered by states that have adopted UFMJRA. Additionally, the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs will most likely bring an enforcement proceeding in a
state that has adopted the UFMJRA because Chevron’s principal place of
business is in California,62 it is incorporated in Delaware,63 and all of the
previous U.S. proceedings surrounding the action have been brought in New
York—all states that have adopted UFMJRA.64
In determining whether the foreign-country judgment satisfies one of the
grounds for non-recognition, courts often rely on common-law notions of
comity and overarching policies of judgment recognition, some of which can
be found in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.65 As Judge Posner
put it, “The process of collecting a judgment is not meant to require a second

60

Id. § 4(b)(1)–(6).
Acts: Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (2005), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act
(last visited Mar. 26, 2011). Fifteen states have adopted the revisions. Legislative Fact Sheet—Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2011).
62 Yaiguaje Complaint, supra note 5.
63 Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Chevron Corporation, CHEVRON (May 30, 2008), http://www.
chevron.com/documents/pdf/certificateofincorporation.pdf.
64 A Few Facts About the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp
(listing
California and Delaware as states that adopted the UFMJRA); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301 (showing that New York
adopted a version of the UFMJRA).
65 See, e.g., Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2009). “A state’s decision to
recognize a foreign judgment will inevitably ‘depend on a variety of circumstances which cannot be reduced to
any certain rule’ but it is understood that ‘no nation will suffer the laws of another to interfere with her own to
the injury of her citizens . . . .’” Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
61
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lawsuit, . . . thus converting every successful multinational suit for damages
into two suits.”66 Rather, a foreign-country judgment that is final, conclusive,
and enforceable is “enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister
state which is entitled to full faith and credit.”67
C. Recent Case Law
While the general goal is to treat foreign-country judgments on the same
basis as sister-state judgments, the fundamental difference between the two is
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to
foreign-country judgments.68 Thus, while sister-state judgment recognition is
mandated by the Constitution, recognition of foreign-country judgments is not,
and the scope of defenses for foreign-country judgment recognition is left free
for the lower courts to interpret. Furthermore, under common law in the United
States, the plaintiff’s cause of action merges in the sister-state judgment.69 As a
result, once a judgment is rendered, the underlying claim of the case is res
judicata—leaving a money judgment, which is the claim for enforcement
elsewhere.70 Foreign-country judgments, on the other hand, do not merge with
the underlying claim, and the judgment is left open for U.S. courts to review.71
The following examines the different approaches courts use in reviewing
foreign-country judgments and interpreting judgment recognition defenses. All
of the cases involve state foreign-country-judgment enforcement statutes that
have adopted UFMJRA in some form.
The first mandatory ground for non-recognition of a foreign-country
judgment under UFMJRA exists when “the judgment was rendered under a
system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law.”72 While all sister-state courts
exercise jurisdiction based on a unified federal due-process standard,73 it is
often particularly difficult to reconcile American due-process concepts with

66

Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
UFMJRA, supra note 34, § 3.
68 The Full Faith and Credit Clause gives Congress the power to prescribe the effect of judgments. U.S.
CONST. art. 4, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Statute exercises this power and states that interstate judgments
have the “same effect as it has where it was rendered.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
69 HAY ET AL., supra note 43, at 1436–39.
70 Id. at 1436-42.
71 Id. at 1442-44.
72 UFMJRA, supra note 34, § 4(a)(1) (emphasis added).
73 HAY ET AL., supra note 43, at 1511 n.2.
67

WESTON GALLEYSFINAL

742

6/28/2011 10:58 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

foreign proceedings.74 In Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi,75 the Ninth Circuit found
an Iranian default judgment lacked due process and affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on behalf of the former Shah of Iran’s sister, a
current resident of California.76 The Bank argued that, under the Algerian
Accords, the U.S. court should enforce the judgment without considering
whether there was due process.77 The court did not agree.78 In determining
whether the Shah’s sister was able to get due process in Iran, the court stated
that the essential components of basic due process are fair treatment from the
courts of Iran, ability to personally appear before the courts, ability to acquire
proper legal representation in Iran, and ability to acquire local witnesses on her
behalf.79 Upon finding that such essential components were likely unavailable
for the Shah’s sister, she was entitled to summary judgment.80
In addition, under the first exception of UFMJRA, courts are required to
evaluate the impartiality of foreign judicial systems. In Bridgeway v.
Citibank,81 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Citibank when a Liberian corporation sought enforcement
of a final judgment by the Supreme Court of Liberia against Citibank.82 One of
the issues on appeal was whether Citibank had sufficient admissible evidence
to support the district court’s holding that the Liberian judiciary, as a matter of
law, was unlikely to render impartial justice during its civil war.83 The court
found two sources to be supportive of the district court’s conclusions: the
Sherman Affidavits, which detailed some of Liberia’s history, and the U.S.
State Department’s Country Reports for Liberia for the years 1994 to 1996,
which described the Liberian judiciary’s handling of cases as corrupt and
incompetent.84 For example, the appointment of the Liberian Supreme Court
justices during its civil war did not follow constitutional requirements because

74

See Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000). (“We cannot believe that the
Illinois statute is intended to bar the enforcement of all judgments of any foreign legal system that does not
conform its procedural doctrines to the latest twist and turn of our courts . . . . It is a fair guess that no foreign
nation has decided to incorporate our due process doctrines into its own procedural law . . . .”).
75 Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995).
76 Id. at 1407.
77 Id. at 1410.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1413.
80 Id.
81 Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
82 Id. at 137, 144.
83 Id. at 142.
84 Id. at 142–43.
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the appointments were secured on the basis of factional loyalties.85 The court
thus affirmed, in favor of not enforcing the Liberian judgment in the United
States due to impartiality concerns.86
While the due-process and impartial-forum defenses principally deal with
procedural aspects of the foreign proceeding, the public policy defense for
judgment recognition is often considered an “umbrella” for a number of
“concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of
recognition.”87 While this defense can also be used to deny recognition on the
basis of procedural defects in the underlying foreign-country judgment, the
defense also covers objections to the substantive outcome of the judgment.88 In
Matusevitch v. Telnikoff,89 the district court held that the judgment should not
be enforced because it was inconsistent with American constitutional
principles when an English Court required the defendant to prove the truth of
his statements in a libel action.90 Relying on the public-policy exception for
non-recognition, the court undertook an analysis of whether the judgment was
repugnant to the public policy of the State of Maryland.91 Finding British libel
law contrary to U.S. libel law, the court held that the English judgment was
“repugnant to the public policies of the State of Maryland and the United
States” and should not be recognized in the United States.92 The court therefore
looked to the underlying claim of the suit, rather than to the foreign legal
system, in evaluating whether the English judgment should have been
enforced. Conversely, Judge Posner in Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden93 took a
different approach to the public policy defense, as seen in the Subpart below.
D. The Rise of the Concept of International Due Process
Judge Posner coined the term “international due process” in Ashenden by
interpreting the requirement of due process to mean, in the international
85

Id. at 142.
Id. at 144.
87 HAY ET AL., supra note 43, at 1515–18.
88 Peter Hay, Comments on Public Policy in Current American Conflicts Law, in DIE RICHTIGE ORDNUNG
89, 93 (Deitmar Baetge et al. eds., 2008).
89 Matusevitch v. Telkinoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
90 Id. at 4. (“In contrast [to English law], the law in the United States requires the plaintiff to prove that
the statements were false and looks to the defendant’s state of mind and intentions.”). The court applied the
law of Maryland, which is governed by the 1962 UFMJRA and the 1964 Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act. Id. at 2.
91 Id. at 3–4.
92 Id. at 4.
93 Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000).
86
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context, that the foreign procedures are “fundamentally fair” and do not offend
basic fairness.94 In Ashenden, the defendants argued the English money
judgments to be unenforceable under the Illinois Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Act because they were denied due process of law.95 In holding that
the judgments did not violate international due process, Judge Posner
interpreted due process “in the Illinois statute . . . to refer to a concept of fair
procedure simple and basic enough to describe the judicial processes of
civilized nations, our peers.”96 Judge Posner, however, avoided determining
the evidence required for demonstrating impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with international due process by distinguishing between countries
“whose adherence to the rule of law and commitment to the norm of due
process are open to serious question” (listing Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
and Congo) and countries whose legal processes are not open to such question
(naming England, the forum of the case).97 Judge Posner further advised that to
determine whether a nation has adhered to the norm of due process, a federal
court should examine any relevant materials or sources, not just evidence
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.98 For example, Judge Posner
would likely agree that U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports could be
used to determine whether there was due process.
Other decisions have subsequently followed this “liberal Ashenden view,”
and it “may well continue to gain in acceptance.”99 However, it is important to
note the difference in approaches by the Ashenden court versus the Telkinoff
court, despite both dealing with the enforcement of English judgments. In
Ashenden, Judge Posner looked to the nature of the judicial system to
determine if it comported with American notions of fairness, as opposed to the
Telkinoff court, which looked to the actual judgment.100 Nonetheless, Judge
Posner qualified the holding in Ashenden by stating that the situation might be
different for judgments from certain nations.101

94 Id. at 477. The court applied the Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. Id. at
475. Judge Posner reminds us that the Illinois statute is “a uniform act, not one intended to reflect the
idiosyncratic jurisprudence of a particular state.” Id. at 476–77.
95 Id. at 476.
96 Id. at 476–77.
97 Id. at 477.
98 Id.
99 Hay, supra note 88, at 94.
100 Id. at 93–94.
101 Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.
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Whether the adoption of the international due process concept will result in
greater receptivity to recognizing and enforcing foreign-country judgments is
certainly questionable; however, it suggests a step towards greater deference to
foreign judicial systems in determining whether to enforce the judgment. For
example, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California recently
recognized and enforced a People’s Republic of China’s (“PRC”) $6.5 million
judgment, citing Ashenden as support.102 The plaintiff in Hubei Gezhouba
Sanlian Industrial Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Inc. first brought suit against the
defendant in the United States in the Los Angeles Superior Court alleging
damages from a helicopter manufactured and designed by the defendant that
crashed into a river in the PRC.103 The California state action was stayed based
on the defendant’s motion under FNC, and the plaintiffs subsequently brought
suit in the PRC.104 Despite having sought an FNC dismissal in favor of
adjudication in the PRC, the defendant failed to appear or participate in the
PRC judgment, and the plaintiffs sought enforcement of the PRC judgment in
Hubei.105
Quoting from Ashenden several times, the district court in Hubei appeared
hesitant to disturb the PRC judgment in finding that none of the UFMRJA
exceptions applied and holding that the PRC’s use of the Hague Convention
for service of process was “compatible with the relaxed notion of due process
of law under Ashenden.”106 For example, the court held that the defendant
could not avail himself of the first mandatory exception of UFMJRA because
the exception only applied to challenge the “system” under which the foreign
country judgment was rendered and could not be used by the defendant to
challenge the actual judgment.107 The court thus reasoned that, since the
defendant did not present any evidence that the PRC court system was partial
or that the procedure was incompatible with the requirements of due process,
the defendant could not challenge the judgment under this exception.108
Interestingly, the court did not even mention any of the defendant’s arguments,
but rather focused on how service of process was proper in order to come to

102 Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Inc., 2009 WL 2190187, at *7–8 (C.D.
Cal. July 22, 2009).
103 Id. at *1–2 (reciting case history).
104 Id. at *2.
105 Id. at *2–4.
106 Id. at *6–7.
107 Id.
108 Id. at *6.
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the conclusion that none of the UFMJRA defenses applied.109 While the court
did not expressly say so, its reasoning was likely due to the fact that the
defendant had previously moved to dismiss the action in the United States
under FNC in favor of having the case heard in the PRC.
In contrast to using Ashenden in favor of enforcement, a district court
recently relied on Judge Posner’s “international due process” concept in
refusing to enforce a foreign country money judgment from Nicaragua in
Osorio v. Dole Food Company.110 The case history of Osorio is strikingly
similar to that of the Chevron case: thousands of Nicaraguan citizens originally
brought suit in the United States against various defendants for the use of
dibromochloroprophane (“DBCP”), an agricultural pesticide that was banned
in the United States in 1977 because it had been shown to cause male
sterility.111 Two of the defendants were Dole Food Company, a Delaware
corporation that used the chemical compound on its Nicaraguan banana farms
until 1979, and Dow Chemical Company, a Delaware corporation that
manufactured DBCP until 1977.112 The court consolidated the cases into
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.113 and then dismissed on FNC grounds, stating that
Nicaragua provided adequate remedies for Nicaraguan plaintiffs.114
In response to the FNC dismissal in Delgado, the 150 Osorio plaintiffs
brought suit in Nicaragua against Dole Food Company and Dow Chemical
Company for injuries resulting from alleged exposure to DBCP while working
on plantation farms in Nicaragua between 1970 and 1982.115 The Nicaraguan
trial court granted the Osorio plaintiffs a judgment of $97.4 million under the
“Special Law for the Conduct of Lawsuits Filed By Persons Affected By the
Use of Pesticides Manufactured with a DBCP Base,” also known as “Special
Law 364,” which was enacted by the Nicaraguan National Assembly shortly
after Delgado.116 To enforce the judgment, the Osorio plaintiffs brought
Osorio v. Dole Food Company before a circuit court in Miami-Dade County in
August 2007, where the defendants then removed the case to a district court in

109

Id. at *6–7.
Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2009), motion for reconsideration
denied, 2010 WL 571806 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
111 Id. at 1311–12 (reciting case history).
112 Id. (reciting case history).
113 Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
114 Id. at 1362, 1372–73.
115 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1311–12.
116 Id. at 1312.
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the Southern District of Florida.117 In holding that the judgment should not be
enforced, the court found that the judgment did not comport with international
due process norms from Ashenden because Nicaragua’s Special Law 364 was
discriminatory and provided the plaintiffs with an “irrefutable presumption of
causation.”118 The court reasoned that “[c]ivilized nations simply do not
subject foreign defendants to the type of discriminatory laws and procedures
mandated by Special Law 364.”119
The rise of the international due-process concept and its increasing
acceptance demonstrates a greater receptivity towards “things foreign,” but it is
uncertain whether one can expect this to become the standard. For instance,
despite the U.S. Supreme Court having previously endorsed applying
international limitations within domestic law,120 would the current Supreme
Court ever uphold applying different standards of due process to international
cases? Nevertheless, the application of the international due-process concept
appears to be a step forward in favor of enforcing foreign-country judgments,
and it seems particularly appropriate for enforcement cases where a U.S. court
in a previous FNC proceeding relied on the impartiality and adequacy of the
foreign tribunal in holding that the case should be dismissed from the United
States. As for preventing the defendant from even taking such an inconsistent
position in the first place, application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel may
be of some assistance and is discussed in the next Subpart.
E. The Use of the Judicial-Estoppel Doctrine in Foreign-Country JudgmentEnforcement Proceedings
Some judgment creditors have attempted to use the doctrine of judicial
estoppel in judgment-enforcement proceedings to prevent the defendant from

117

Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1345.
119 Id.
120 In F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), the Court set international
limitations for applying domestic law to foreign affairs on the basis of prescriptive comity in holding that the
Sherman Act does not apply to foreign anti-competitive conduct and its foreign effects. Id. at 169. Justice
Scalia, who wrote for the majority, previously defined prescriptive comity as “the respect sovereign nations
afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Empagran majority adopted Justice Scalia’s “prescriptive comity” notions
and concluded that “if America’s antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international
marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal
imperialism, through legislative fiat.” Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169.
118
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avoiding a foreign-country judgment. The Supreme Court described the
doctrine of judicial estoppel as that
where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply
because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position,
especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in
121
the position formerly taken by him.

To invoke the doctrine, the Second Circuit in Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank
required the party to demonstrate that “(1) the party against whom the estoppel
is asserted took an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding and (2) that
position was adopted by the first tribunal in some manner.”122 In addition to
arguments previously discussed, Bridgeway argued that Citibank should be
judicially estopped from raising the question of impartiality of the Liberian
courts because Citibank had voluntarily participated in at least a dozen civil
cases before Liberian courts.123 The court found that Citibank was not
judicially estopped because Citibank did not previously argue that the Liberian
courts were impartial—all it did was submit to the jurisdiction of the Liberian
court when Bridgeway brought suit against it, and participation is not an
admission that the Liberian courts are fair and impartial.124
In Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi,125 the Bank also made a judicial-estoppel
argument for enforcing the Iranian judgment against Pahlavi in the United
States.126 In an earlier, unrelated action, Pahlavi had argued for dismissal on
FNC grounds, stating that Iran was the proper place for trial.127 Citing this
earlier action, the Bank argued that Pahlavi should be judicially estopped from
claiming that Iran is an unsuitable forum.128 However, in the former case,
Pahlavi had complained that even though the Iranian government “ha[d] seen
fit to nullify fundamental fairness and due process,” that fact should not have
permitted the other party to argue against her contention that Iran was the most
convenient forum.129 Thus, Pahlavi’s previous argument was effectively that
121 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689
(1895)).
122 Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2000).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.

WESTON GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 10:58 AM

THE ENFORCEMENT LOOPHOLE

749

Iran could not take action against her in the United States or in Iran. The court
found that this was consistent with her position in this case and did not agree
with the Bank that Pahlavi should be judicially estopped from claiming that
Iran was an unsuitable forum.130
In addition, the Osorio plaintiffs argued that the defendants should be
judicially estopped from challenging the adequacy of the Nicaraguan judiciary
based on the defendants’ position in favor of an FNC dismissal in the Delgado
litigation.131 The court rejected this argument for various reasons.132 First, the
Osorio plaintiffs did not participate in the Delgado litigation, and mutuality of
parties is required under the judicial-estoppel doctrine in Florida law.133
Second, when the case was dismissed under FNC, Special Law 364 did not
exist, and the court determined that the effect of the law on DBCP litigation
“fundamentally altered the legal landscape in Nicaragua.”134 Since the
defendants could not have predicted this, the court found their position, that
Nicaragua was an inadequate forum, consistent with their earlier position and
therefore held that the defendants should not be estopped from challenging the
adequacy of the Nicaraguan forum.135
The above holdings demonstrate the issues with applying the doctrine of
judicial estoppel in the context of corporations employing the enforcement
loophole. Due to the fact that transnational tort litigation is often drawn out for
many years, a U.S. court can easily find occurrences that have “altered the
legal landscape” and thus rendered the doctrine of judicial estoppel
inappropriate. The result for plaintiffs is devastating. Having relied on the U.S.
FNC dismissal, plaintiffs expended significant resources to get to the
enforcement stage, only to find that their supposed “multi-million dollar”
judgment meant nothing. In contrast, defendants were able to sidestep any
liability in exchange for litigation costs that paled in comparison to the alleged
harm caused.

130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WESTON GALLEYSFINAL

750

6/28/2011 10:58 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

II. THE CURRENT METHOD OF JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS
ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORPORATE LITIGATION STRATEGY
Corporate accountability entails holding corporations liable for the social
implications of their business practices.136 While numerous U.S. laws constrain
domestic companies from negatively affecting human health and the
environment, holding corporations accountable in the international context is
considerably more difficult.137 Large multinational corporations often send
corporate operations abroad to take advantage of cheaper operating costs.138
These corporate activities significantly impact foreign communities, and few
regulations curtail their behavior.139 Adjudication, and subsequent liability, is
often the only form of deterrence for corporations and the only means of
protection for those who are harmed by corporations’ exploitative behaviors.140
Nonetheless, the current method of judgment enforcement in the United States
encourages corporate defendants to drag suits out for decades by providing
defendants with a backup plan. Even if plaintiffs are ultimately able to obtain a
foreign-country judgment holding a corporation responsible for its actions
abroad, corporate defendants can avoid the enforcement of the judgment in the
United States, where the majority, if not all, of their assets are located, by
claiming that the judgment is unenforceable under one of UFMJRA’s three
mandatory and six discretionary defenses to recognition and enforcement.141
The litigation strategy employed by corporate defendants sued in the
United States for transnational torts has led commentators to coin the term
“boomerang litigation.”142 If the corporation is successful in having the suit
dismissed under FNC, the corporation is dealt a lucky hand of cards: if one
card does not work to its favor, it can just try another with little or no recourse.
The following Subparts address the many tactics employed by corporations
such as Chevron. To begin with, relatively few groups of plaintiffs pass the
initial hurdle of bringing suit in the alternative foreign forum after the FNC

136 See Melody Saint-Saens & Amy J. Bann, Using National Security to Undermine Corporate
Accountability Litigation: The ExxonMobil v. Doe Controversy, 11 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 39, 50
(2003).
137 See id.
138 Id. at 51.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See infra Part II.D.
142 Casey & Ristroph, supra note 41, at 21.
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dismissal.143 While corporations have money to burn on expensive litigation
costs rather than on implementing measures to increase accountability,
plaintiffs often run out of money after the FNC dismissal or settle for
insignificant amounts.144 The first Subpart thus examines the many issues
resulting from an FNC dismissal. The second Subpart discusses how some
plaintiffs encounter an additional hurdle by being precluded from bringing suit
in the alternative forum due to “blocking statutes,” retaliatory statutes enacted
by some Latin American countries that are designed to discourage FNC
dismissals.145 The third Subpart discusses courts’ use of stipulated conditions
to FNC dismissals in an attempt to curb a corporation’s evasive litigation
tactics, and it looks at how corporations have dealt with such conditions.
Finally, the last Subpart discusses the tactics employed by corporations during
litigation in the alternative forum and discusses the use of the enforcement
loophole.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of FNC is often a corporation’s most effective tool for
defeating a plaintiff’s suit without having to adjudicate on the merits.146 While
this Comment does not advocate the abolition of the FNC doctrine, it does seek
to examine the concerns raised by an FNC dismissal and the role judgment
enforcement should play in addressing these concerns.
A corporation can bring a motion to dismiss under FNC in federal and most
state courts.147 However, while only three states do not recognize the doctrine

143 Id. at 27. The majority of foreign plaintiffs either decide not to sue in the alternative forum or settle for
a fraction of what they hoped to recover in litigation. Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum
Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 335 (1994).
144 Id. For example, after the court in Delgado v. Shell Oil Company granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss under FNC, most of the plaintiffs “subsequently settled for only a fraction of what the plaintiffs
reasonably could have anticipated to recover if the case remained in . . . court.” Heiser, supra note 40, at 621.
145 See infra Part III.B. On the other hand, enactment of blocking statutes has in a few instances benefited
the plaintiffs in the FNC stage of the proceedings. Id. Under a blocking statute, a foreign country will dismiss
the suit for lack of jurisdiction if the plaintiff has previously been dismissed from the United States under
FNC. Id. Thus, if a foreign country has a blocking statute, then technically the plaintiff does not have an
alternative forum and whether there is an alternative forum is the first determination for a court undergoing an
FNC analysis. Id. However, only a handful of U.S. courts have retained jurisdiction and denied motions to
dismiss for FNC under this line of reasoning. Id.
146 Emil Petrossian, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational Forum Shopping in the United States
and England, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1257, 1300 (2007).
147 Id. at 1301.
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of FNC,148 some states have significantly limited the applications of FNC.149
For example, in 1990, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the Texas
legislature statutorily abolished the doctrine in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro
Alfaro and affirmed the court of appeals’ refusal to dismiss on FNC grounds
where plaintiffs brought suit for personal injuries suffered from exposure to a
pesticide manufactured by defendants.150 While the Texas legislature has since
amended its statute to allow an FNC dismissal to be invoked against nonresident plaintiffs, application of the doctrine is precluded where the plaintiff is
a “legal resident” of Texas.151
In Justice Doggett’s concurring opinion in Dow Chemical, he discusses the
importance of corporate accountability for torts committed abroad and the
destructive role of FNC.152 In light of the world’s current rate of globalization,
“[t]he misconduct of even a few multinational corporations can affect untold
millions around the world.”153 The doctrine of FNC reflects the struggle
encountered by U.S. courts between immunizing multinational corporations in
the United States through dismissal on the one hand,154 and depriving
developing nations the opportunity to vindicate torts committed at home
through retaining the litigation in the United States on the other hand.155 In
Justice Doggett’s opinion, through dismissing suits under the FNC doctrine,
the United States permits corporations to use a “double-standard” for its
actions abroad.156 Justice Doggett provides numerous examples where U.S.
corporations have used foreign countries as an industrial “garbage can” by
continuing to heavily market products and chemicals abroad after they have
been banned domestically.157 For instance, American companies exported to
Africa, Asia, and South America nearly 2.4 million pieces of sleepwear after
the United States imposed a domestic ban on selling the sleepwear due to its

148 PETER HAY, RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB & PATRICK J. BORCHERS, CONFLICT OF LAW: CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES 201 n.6 (2009). The three states are Oregon, Montana, and Idaho. Id. Despite having not
recognized it, none of the three has expressly rejected it. Id.
149 Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 674 (Tex. 1990).
150 Id.
151 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.05(e) (2003).
152 Dow Chem. Co., 786 S.W.2d at 680–89. (Doggett, J., concurring).
153 Id. at 688.
154 Id.
155 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842,
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
156 Dow Chem. Co., 786 S.W.2d at 687–89 (Doggett, J., concurring).
157 Id.
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treatment with the cancer-causing chemical TRIS.158 In addition, after the
United States banned the pesticide DBCP, the chemical at issue in Osorio,
Dole continued to use it for three years on its banana farms in Nicaragua.159
In coming to the conclusion that abolishing FNC is the best way to achieve
international comity, Justice Doggett reasoned that the developing world will
become increasingly distrustful and outraged if U.S. courts continue to permit
corporations to use it as the “‘industrial world’s garbage can’” through
immunizing corporations from suit in the United States.160 But, as stated
before, not all believe that abolishing the FNC doctrine is the answer. District
Judge Keenan, in contrast, granted the corporate defendant’s motion to dismiss
under FNC in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster,161 reasoning that
retaining the litigation in the United States would “deprive the Indian judiciary
of this opportunity to stand tall before the world and to pass judgment on
behalf of its own people.”162
In 1984, lethal gas escaped from a chemical plant operated by Union
Carbide India Limited in Bhopal, India, killing more than 2000 people and
injuring over 200,000 people.163 All actions brought by Indian plaintiffs in the
United States were consolidated before the U.S. District Court of the Southern
District of New York in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster.164 In
support of the dismissal, Judge Keenan associated the failure to dismiss under
FNC with imperialism, where “an established sovereign inflict[s] its rules, its
standards and values on a developing nation.”165 Thus, Justice Doggett’s
opinion and Judge Keenan’s opinion portray the two ends of the spectrum in
evaluating the different concerns raised by an FNC dismissal. While providing
injured foreign plaintiffs with a forum in which to recover is certainly
desirable, depriving a country of the opportunity to vindicate harms occurred at
home is not. Enforcement of the foreign-country judgment in the United States
is the key to reconciling Doggett and Keenan’s divergent views without having
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Id. at 688.
Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
160 Dow Chem. Co., 786 S.W.2d at 687 (Doggett, J., concurring) (quoting Dana J. Jacob, Hazardous
Experts from a Human Rights Perspective, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 81, 101 (1983)) (quoting Hon. Michael D.
Barnes, Rep. MD).
161 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
162 Id. at 867.
163 Id. at 844.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 867.
159
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to abolish the doctrine of FNC: not only does it provide the foreign country the
opportunity to vindicate its own citizens’ rights, but it holds corporations
accountable by requiring them to pay the injured plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the current foreign-country judgmentenforcement scheme in the United States has failed to live up to its potential
for solving some of the issues raised by an FNC dismissal. For example, the
claims against the defendants in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro that upset
Justice Doggett so deeply are the same underlying claims of the Nicaraguan
judgment in Osorio, in which the Florida district court judge refused to enforce
the Nicaraguan judgment against the corporate defendants.166 Rather than
showing deference to the foreign judicial system’s efforts to vindicate harms
against its own nationals, the judge in Osorio undertook a detailed analysis of
the foreign litigation in coming to the conclusion that the Nicaraguan judgment
should not be enforced.167 Thus, despite the plaintiffs having overcome the
many hurdles imposed after an FNC dismissal, current judgment-enforcement
practice foreclosed the plaintiffs’ attempts to hold the corporate defendants
Dole and Dow accountable for harm caused.
B. Retaliatory Legislation by Latin American Countries
In response to the increased use of the FNC doctrine, some Latin American
countries have responded by enacting retaliatory statutes that either preclude
domestic courts from hearing any action that has been dismissed under FNC or
enable domestic courts to apply similar tort liability and damages as that of the
foreign court which dismissed the action under FNC.168 The former is referred
to as a blocking statute. It is designed to affect a U.S. court’s FNC analysis as
to whether there is an alternative forum—the first determination for assessing
the appropriateness of an FNC dismissal—and has created an additional hurdle
for many plaintiffs to overcome after an FNC dismissal.169
These blocking statutes are intended to discourage U.S. courts from
granting an FNC dismissal by eliminating the plaintiff’s alternate forum: when
a plaintiff brings suit in the alternative country following an FNC dismissal,

166 Compare Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 688 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J.,
concurring), with Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
167 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
168 Heiser, supra note 40, at 622.
169 Id.
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that country’s court will dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction.170 While a
handful of U.S. courts have denied motions to dismiss for FNC under this line
of reasoning,171 some courts have concluded nonetheless that the alternative
country is an adequate forum, despite the blocking statutes, as long as the
defendants consent to jurisdiction.172 As a result, while blocking statutes may
have an effect on a corporations’ use of FNC as a defense tactic by
discouraging U.S. courts from applying it,173 the statutes have also prevented
some plaintiffs from ever having the opportunity to adjudicate their claims on
the merits.174
The second type of retaliatory legislation enacted by some Latin American
countries is a statute enabling domestic courts to apply similar tort liability and
damages as that of the foreign country that dismissed the action under FNC.175
Special Law No. 364, the Nicaraguan law in dispute in Osorio, is an example
of such retaliatory legislation.176
The effect of this second type of retaliatory legislation on plaintiffs is
significant. While it provides similar American recovery standards and offers
plaintiffs a choice of fora by not precluding those plaintiffs that first brought
suit in the United States, it damages the plaintiffs’ probability of having the
judgment recognized and enforced by a U.S. court in the event that the
defendant does not have sufficient assets in the foreign forum, which is
frequently the case. This is exactly what happened in Osorio: the plaintiffs had
to bring action against defendants Dole and Dow in the United States to
recover under the Nicaraguan judgment, and the U.S. court refused to enforce
the judgment upon finding that Special Law 364 violated both due process and

170

Id. at 623.
E.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1125–32 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (finding
Venezuela to be an unavailable forum due to Venezuela’s blocking statutes); Canales Martinez v. Dow Chem.
Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 741 (E.D. La. 2002) (finding Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Philippines to be
unavailable fora where each country had a blocking statute).
172 E.g., Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 689 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that Venezuela is
an available alternative forum); Paulownia Plantations de Panama Corp. v. Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d 128, 675
(Minn. 2009) (finding that Panama is an available alternative forum).
173 See Heiser, supra note 40, at 659–61.
174 See, e.g., Morales, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (finding that Venezuela is an available alternative forum
even though the courts in Venezuela would have dismissed the cases under the blocking statutes);
Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d at 136–37 (finding that Panama is an available alternative forum even though the
courts in Panama would have dismissed the cases under the blocking statutes).
175 Heiser, supra note 40, at 622.
176 Id. at 631.
171
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Florida’s public policy.177 Thus, while Special Law 364 was designed to assist
injured plaintiffs in recovery, it had the opposite effect for the Osorio plaintiffs
and damaged their chances of ever being compensated for their injuries.178
Retaliatory legislation is an attempt by foreign countries to counter the
adverse effects of FNC dismissals. One commentator has suggested that the
legislation may help discourage corporate defendants from using FNC as a
defense tactic in transnational tort litigation because a U.S. defendant may
perceive no benefit to an FNC dismissal where the foreign country’s laws
mirror U.S. tort liability and damages.179 But, for the retaliatory legislation to
act as a deterrent, the U.S. must enforce the foreign country judgment against
the defendant’s assets, and, as Osorio demonstrates, current U.S. judgment
enforcement once again fails to foot the bill. It instead provides corporate
defendants with the ability to fight enforcement and circumvent any
accountability.
C. Stipulated Conditions in FNC Dismissals
In the unlikely event that plaintiffs are successful in bringing an action
before the alternative forum, corporations can, and often do, draw the trial out
for years as they continue to employ their evasive litigation strategies. Courts
have attempted to limit corporate defendants by stipulating conditions in FNC
dismissals.180 Conditional dismissals under FNC often revolve around the
doctrine’s threshold issue of whether there is an adequate alternative forum
available.181 Under this line of reasoning, defendants are often required to
consent to jurisdiction in the foreign forum and waive any applicable statuteof-limitations defenses.182 Some courts have even attempted to deal with the

177

See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
As a point of comparison, prior to Osorio, one commentator, Walter Heiser, analyzed possible
enforcement defenses regarding judgments rendered under Special Law 364. Heiser, supra note 40, at 656–57.
Recognizing that the law’s irrebuttable presumption in favor of causation may raise due process concerns, the
commentator nonetheless found that “[g]iven the limited and discretionary nature of UFMJRA’s public policy
exception, and the recognition that a foreign law need not be identical to domestic law, a Nicaraguan judgment
based on Special Law No. 364’s irrebuttable presumption as to causation will likely be enforced by a United
States Court.” Id. at 657.
179 Id. at 659–61.
180 See Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Validity and Propriety of Conditions Imposed upon Proceeding in a
Foreign Forum by Federal Court in Dismissing Action Under Forum Non Conveniens, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 238
(1988).
181 Id. at 291.
182 E.g., Banco de Seguros del Estado v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 500 F. Supp. 2d 251, 266 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (granting defendants’ motions to dismiss for FNC on the condition that defendants accept service of
178
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enforcement loophole through requiring the defendant to agree to satisfy any
foreign country judgment rendered by the alternate forum.183
Nonetheless, corporate defendants often manage to side-step the conditions.
The corporate defendant’s first option is to appeal the conditions as Union
Carbide Corporation (“UCC”) did in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant
Disaster.184 The lower court granted the FNC dismissal on three conditions,
one of which was that the defendant must agree to satisfy any judgment issued
by an Indian court against it “where such judgment and affirmance comport
with the minimal requirements of due process.”185 Following the plaintiffs’
appeal to the Second Circuit, the Second Circuit deleted the condition,186
finding that it contained ambiguous “due process” language and was based on
the erroneous legal assumption that plaintiffs might not be able to enforce an
Indian judgment against UCC in the United States.187 The Second Circuit
reasoned that New York’s judgment-enforcement statute fully served the
district court’s purpose behind the condition of ensuring that defendants satisfy
any ultimate Indian judgment.188
The corporate defendant’s second option is to simply ignore stipulated
conditions as the defendants in Osorio, Dole and Dow, did in Nicaragua by
fighting jurisdiction in the foreign proceeding.189 In Delgado, the underlying
FNC dismissal proceeding that predated Osorio, the court granted the FNC
dismissal with the condition that the defendants, who included Dole and
Dow,190 waive all jurisdictional defenses because, without such a condition, the

process in Uruguay, consent to jurisdiction of Uruguay, and waive any statute-of-limitations defense);
Thomas, supra note 180, at 241.
183 See Thomas, supra note 180, at 254.
184 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 197
(2d Cir. 1987).
185 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842,
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
186 Id. at 205–06.
187 Id. at 205.
188 Id. New York has enacted a version of the UFMJRA. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301. The government of India
reached a settlement with Union Carbide India Limited in February of 1989 for $470 million to be paid to the
government, which would be responsible for compensating the victims, and the Supreme Court of India
approved the settlement as just and reasonable. HAY, WEINTRAUB & BORCHERS, supra note 148, at 199 n.1.
However, after almost twenty-seven years since the disaster, the recompense has proved to be insufficient and
some victims are still waiting to be compensated. Suchandana Gupta, Bhopal Gas Tragedy: All Papers in
Order, but Denied Their Due, TIMES OF INDIA (Dec. 1, 2009, 5:25 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/Bhopal-Gas-Tragedy-All-papers-in-order-but-denied-their-due/articleshow/5286523.cms.
189 Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
190 Id. at 1312 (reciting factual history).
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alternative fora would not be available.191 As a result, while none of the Osorio
plaintiffs were plaintiffs in Delgado,192 the Osorio plaintiffs’ best chance for
recovery was to bring suit in Nicaragua in light of the Delgado holding.
Nonetheless, after the Osorio plaintiffs brought action against Dole and Dow
under Special Law No. 364, the defendants contested the trial court’s
jurisdiction on the grounds that they wished to exercise opt-out rights under
Article 7 of Special Law 364 in exchange for waiving any FNC arguments in
U.S. courts.193 It appears that Dole and Dow were having second thoughts
regarding their chosen forum and wished to return to the United States.
Furthermore, corporate defendants can sidestep dismissal conditions
through instituting “boomerang litigation”—for example, by filing arbitration
actions similar to what Chevron did in the AAA and The Hague.194 Despite
Chevron having consented in writing to jurisdiction in Ecuador,195 the issue
has gone from an Ecuadorian trial court, to the AAA, to a New York state
court, to a New York federal district court, to The Hague, and again back to a
New York federal district court.196 And, rest assured, it will not stop there: the
enforcement proceedings have yet to come.
D. The Corporate Defendant’s Last Resort: The Enforcement Loophole
The enforcement loophole is the corporate defendant’s last resort for
avoiding accountability: when all else fails and the plaintiffs finally receive a
foreign-country judgment, the corporation can fight enforcement of that
judgment in the United States. As previously discussed, UFMJRA provides
three mandatory and six discretionary bases for non-recognition of a
foreign-country judgment.197 While the statute is designed to “inform[] foreign
nations of particular situations in which their judgments would definitely be
recognized,”198 the statute also provides corporate defendants with situations
where a court will refuse to recognize the judgment. Due to the fact that
foreign proceedings, like U.S. proceedings, may drag out for years,199 the
191

Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1372 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.
193 Id. at 1318.
194 See supra Introduction.
195 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 534, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
196 Yaiguaje Complaint, supra note 5, at 3–5.
197 UFMJRA, supra note 34, § 4(a)–(b).
198 Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
199 For example, the Lago Agrio litigation has been ongoing since 2003. See Luis Ángel Saavedra,
Chevron Strikes Back, LATINAMERICAN PRESS (Feb. 24, 2011), www.lapress.org/articles.asp?art=6316.
192
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corporate defendant can easily compile a significant amount of evidence
tailored towards these nine bases for non-recognition in preparation for a U.S.
judgment-enforcement proceeding.
As previously discussed, relatively few plaintiffs make it to the
enforcement stage in transnational tort litigation. The plaintiffs in Osorio were
some of the lucky few to get that far, but nonetheless, Dole and Dow have so
far avoided enforcement by capitalizing on the exceptions under Florida’s
judgment-recognition act.200 For example, despite the Nicaraguan trial court
having denied the defendants’ jurisdictional challenges,201 the defendants
raised the same jurisdictional argument before the court in Osorio.202 Upon
coming to the conclusion that the Nicaraguan trial court had misinterpreted
Article 7 of Special Law 364, the Osorio court agreed with the defendants that
they had invoked their opt-out rights under Article 7, divesting the Nicaraguan
trial court of jurisdiction.203 Defendants thus successfully exploited the
enforcement loophole: despite having consented to jurisdiction in Nicaragua
during the FNC proceeding, defendants manufactured the Nicaraguan litigation
so that it fell under Florida’s lack-of-jurisdiction exception to enforcement and
then reopened the jurisdiction issue, which was already adjudicated by the
Nicaraguan trial court, for review by the Osorio court.
The Osorio plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the defendants’ use of the
enforcement loophole by arguing that the “defendants [had] intentionally
sabotaged their own defense in Nicaragua [by failing to make certain motions
or present certain evidence] to artificially manufacture a defense to
enforcement on due process grounds in a later enforcement action.”204 Despite
the plaintiffs’ allegations seeming plausible given the existence of the
enforcement loophole, the Osorio court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments by
reasoning that, even if the defendants had raised the motions or presented the
evidence to the Nicaraguan trial court, neither would have affected the trial’s
outcome.205 However, the court’s reasoning ignores the overarching issue that,
rather than take the trial in the foreign tribunal seriously through raising
necessary motions and presenting applicable evidence, the defendants

—

200 Florida has enacted the UFMJRA. Legislative Fact Sheet Foreign Money Judgments Recognition
Act, supra note 53.
201 Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
202 Id. at 1326.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 1344.
205 Id.
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manipulated the trial to provide a U.S. court with additional support that they
were deprived of due process during the foreign country proceedings.
Furthermore, the court’s opinion in Osorio demonstrates the differences
between a court’s analysis of the alternative forum in the FNC stage of the
proceedings and a court’s analysis of the alternative forum in the enforcement
stage of the proceedings. In determining whether Nicaragua was an available
and adequate alternative forum in Delgado (the preceding FNC dismissal
proceeding), the court found that even where there was a current standoff
between the president, national assembly, and legislature regarding certain
constitutional reforms, Nicaragua was an available forum to the plaintiffs.206
The court further found that Nicaraguan courts would not treat plaintiffs
unfairly or deprive them of remedies based on a single affidavit submitted by
an associate justice of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua.207 In comparison, the
Osorio court undertook an extensive analysis of Nicaragua’s law and trialcourt proceedings to find that Nicaragua’s trial-court proceedings lacked due
process208 and were not impartial.209 Even though the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that Nicaraguan laws on paper provided for an impartial
judiciary, the Osorio court nonetheless held that the Nicaraguan court was not
an impartial judiciary because “[p]laintiffs [had] not shown that the
Nicaraguan judiciary actually operates independently and impartially” where
defendants had provided evidence that it did not.210 In coming to this
conclusion, the Osorio court examined not only the Osorio proceedings in
Nicaragua,211 but U.S. State Department reports,212 reports from other foreign
governments and international organizations,213 and expert testimony,214 to
name a few.
In light of the Lago Agrio judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Chevron will
now have its opportunity to seize on the enforcement loophole. With the aid of
secretly-taped videos involving formerly presiding Judge Nuñez and alleged
briberies, and U.S. State Department reports describing the Ecuadorian
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207
208
209
210
211
212
213
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Delgado v. Shell Oil, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1357 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
Id. at 1362.
Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1326–46 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
See id. at 1347–51.
Id. at 1349.
See id. at 1351.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1348–49.
Id. at 1349–51.
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judiciary as corrupt,215 Chevron will have ample opportunity to capitalize on
not only the fraud exception, but on the due-process and impartial-forum
exception as well, in fighting enforcement under the current system.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Corporations such as Chevron should not be allowed to manipulate the U.S.
judicial system to avoid accountability for their behavior abroad. While the
doctrine of FNC developed with the principal policy interest of conserving
judicial resources,216 the current regime of judgment enforcement has
frustrated such a purpose by providing corporate defendants with a guideline
for how to avoid enforcement. FNC certainly has issues of its own: many
commentators criticize it as being incoherent, arbitrary, and unconstitutional,
and some advocate abandoning the doctrine altogether.217 Nonetheless, the
downfalls of the doctrine appear to be a necessary evil to “prevent[] forum
shopping by those plaintiffs seeking the most favorable law and promote[] the
efficient administration of justice by ensuring that the dispute is heard in a
forum with a sufficient connection to the case.”218 Enforcement of the
foreign-country judgment in the United States is the key to solving many of the
issues raised by an FNC dismissal because not only is it consistent with the
dismissing court’s initial assessment as to the adequacy and desirability of
adjudication in the foreign tribunal, but it also holds corporations accountable
by requiring them to satisfy the judgment.

215 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 534, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
In Aguinda, reports from the U.S. Department of State and the Government of Ecuador were submitted to the
court to support plaintiffs’ arguments that the Ecuadorian courts were not impartial forums. Id. at 544. The
court found them to be “of little use” because “they largely consisted (perhaps understandably) of broad,
conclusory assertions as to the relative corruptibility or incorruptibility of the Ecuadorian courts, with scant
reference to specifics, evidence, or application to the instant cases.” Id. Contrastingly, U.S. Department of
State reports are often relied on in enforcement proceedings in finding that a foreign tribunal was not impartial.
See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2000) (relying on U.S. State
Department Country Reports for Liberia to support the holding in favor of not enforcing the Liberian judgment
in the United States due to impartiality concerns); Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1347–48
(S.D. Fla. 2009) (examining U.S. State Department Country Reports for Nicaragua to support the holding that
Nicaragua was not an impartial forum).
216 Casey & Ristroph, supra note 41, at 41.
217 See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Tear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on
the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2006).
218 Emily J. Derr, Striking a Better Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 819, 823–24 (2008).
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As previously mentioned, during an enforcement proceeding for a U.S.
interstate judgment, the underlying claim is merged into the judgment and the
second U.S. court can thus only evaluate the judgment.219 As a result, even
where the second court finds the claim to be offensive, the second court must
enforce the judgment because the issue is res judicata and the plaintiff is barred
from raising any issues that the plaintiff either did raise or could have raised in
the first proceeding.220 In contrast, the U.S. judicial system does not apply the
same merger policies and res judicata effect to foreign-country judgments as
the United States does in interstate settings.221
One rationale in favor of stricter review in the international context, leaving
aside the notion that interstate recognition is constitutionally mandated under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is that there is no supreme world court to
review the propriety of foreign-country judgments, whereas the U.S. Supreme
Court has the capacity to review interstate judgments. Under this line of
reasoning, it is necessary for an enforcing court to have the capacity to review
a claim to ensure the propriety of the foreign country’s judgment. However,
where a court has previously litigated the adequacy of a foreign tribunal in an
FNC proceeding, the necessity of such stringent review is lacking.
The underlying premise of this Comment’s proposed solution is to exclude
relitigation at the enforcement stage of issues considered at the FNC dismissal
stage. When a defendant moves for an FNC dismissal, the defendant and the
granting court make the general assessment in favor of the foreign system. If
the dismissal includes the conclusion that the foreign system is adequate,
anything that was knowable at the time and could have been raised or was
raised is res judicata. Otherwise, to allow a corporate defendant to backtrack
on its view of the foreign judicial system encourages the corporation to use
complex litigation strategies for avoiding a huge payout and wastes substantial
judicial resources.
In the event that the Lago Agrio plaintiffs reach the enforcement stage in
the United States, Chevron will likely argue that the Lago Agrio judgment
should not be enforced because “the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law,” the first mandatory ground for non-

219
220
221

HAY ET AL., supra note 43, at 1436–42.
Id. at 1439–42.
Id. at 1442–44.
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recognition in UFMJRA.222 This first mandatory exception to recognition has
two components under which a defendant may argue: first, that the tribunal
was not impartial; and second, that the procedures used during the trial were
incompatible with requirements of due process of law.
As to the first component, Chevron possesses evidence documenting
alleged briberies to support an argument that the Ecuadorian tribunal was not
impartial. However, under this Comment’s proposed solution, Chevron would
be precluded from arguing that the foreign system was inadequate or not
impartial based on anything that was knowable or foreseeable at the time of the
FNC dismissal in Aguinda. At the time of Aguinda, U.S. State Department
Reports described Ecuador’s legal and judicial systems as “politicized,
inefficient, and sometimes corrupt.”223 In the face of such evidence, Chevron
took the position that Ecuador could nonetheless provide “an adequate legal
forum”224 and the district court agreed by finding that, even though “no one
claims the Ecuadorian judiciary is wholly immune to corruption,”225 the
judicial system of Ecuador could exercise the “modicum of independence and
impartiality necessary to an adequate alternative forum” in adjudicating the
plaintiffs’ claims.226 Both Chevron and the U.S. district court thus recognized
the possibility of corruption and undue influence and were willing to take the
chance. Having made this general assessment in favor of Ecuador’s judicial
system, the issue became res judicata, precluding Chevron from asserting
otherwise.
On the one hand, it was arguably unforeseeable that the presiding judge in
the Lago Agrio litigation would participate in a bribery scandal and the
evidence provides support of the Ecuadorian government’s control over its
judiciary. However, after the secret tapes surfaced, Judge Nuñez recused
himself from the litigation,227 and the opportunity for Chevron to seek appeal is
available within the Ecuadorian judicial system.228 Therefore, despite the
compromising evidence, the facts as they currently stand would not reach the
threshold under this Comment’s proposed solution for reopening the issue of
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UFMJRA, supra note 34, § 4(a)(1).
Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
224 Brief for Appellee at 39, Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (No. 2002-7756).
225 Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
226 Id. at 545–46.
227 Gonzalez & Casselman, supra note 30.
228 Yaiguaje Complaint, supra note 5, at 16. (“The losing party will have the option of availing itself of
two layers of appeal in Ecuador . . . .”).
223
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the judicial system’s adequacy during the enforcement proceeding. A difficult,
remaining concern is the issue of what would reach the threshold, enabling a
defendant to reargue the adequacy of a foreign tribunal’s judicial system. After
all, it would be undesirable to leave a defendant utterly defenseless in the event
of military overthrows or outbreaks of war in the alternative forum.
During the FNC proceeding stage, courts are extremely hesitant to
“‘assume that the courts of a sister democracy are unable to dispense justice,’
and something more than bald assertion is required to overcome this
presumption.”229 Contrastingly, courts during the enforcement-proceeding
stage, as demonstrated by the previous discussion on Osorio, seem to be much
quicker to find that a foreign tribunal lacks due process or impartiality.230
However, in light of the desirability of showing the utmost respect to foreign
countries and their judicial systems, courts in enforcement proceedings should
show the same degree of hesitancy during the enforcement stage as they do in
the FNC stage for evaluating impartiality and due process concerns in foreign
proceedings. Therefore, just as a court would not dismiss under FNC to a
forum that was engaged in war or had recently been occupied during a military
coup,231 a court during an enforcement proceeding would not enforce a
judgment rendered under similar instances of instability. Bringing in line an
enforcing court’s analysis with that of the court that granted the FNC dismissal
would show respect to the foreign country tribunal that expended significant
resources in adjudicating the dispute, while ensuring that a defendant is not left
utterly defenseless to an alternative forum’s judgment after obtaining an FNC
dismissal.
As for the second component to the first mandatory ground for nonrecognition, defendants often argue that the procedure under which the case
was tried was incompatible with the requirements of due process. This is where
Posner’s notion of international due process arises.232 For example, the
defendants in Osorio argued that numerous provisions of Special Law 364
failed to provide them with “basic fairness” and thus were incompatible with

229 Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (quoting Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994)).
230 See supra Part II.D (regarding the differences between the Delgado court’s analysis and the Osorio
court’s analysis of Nicaragua as an available and alternative forum).
231 E.g., Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania, 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1341–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(refusing to dismiss under FNC where a military junta was currently in power in Chile and thus raised serious
questions about the Chilean judiciary’s independence).
232 See supra Part II.D.
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the requirements of due process.233 Evaluating this argument, the Osorio court
applied Posner’s definition of international due process and analyzed whether
an irrefutable presumption of causation under the Special Law 364 constituted
a procedure consistent with due process and whether the remaining provisions
of the law constituted discriminatory treatment of foreign defendants.234 As a
result, while Posner in Ashenden mainly looked to the nature of the judicial
system to determine if it comported with American notions of fairness, the
Osorio court, in contrast, looked to the underlying claim, holding that the
Nicaraguan judgment was inconsistent with due process where Special Law
364 contained an irrefutable presumption of causation. The Osorio court’s
analysis is comparable to that of the Telkinoff court in which the court held that
an English judgment was inconsistent with due process because the English
court required the defendant to prove the truth of his statements in a libel
action.
Under this Comment’s proposed solution, a U.S. court would not be
permitted to pass judgment on another foreign country’s laws where the case
had previously been dismissed under FNC. When a court dismisses under
FNC, the dismissing U.S. court has made the assessment that the foreign
tribunal comports with the minimum level of due process required and has
subsequently passed on a significant burden to the foreign tribunal. In addition,
it should be remembered that the FNC dismissal is based on the defendant’s
wishes: the FNC-granting court declines to hear a case over which it has
jurisdiction based on the defendant’s motion. The defendant thus voluntarily
assumes the risk that it may not receive the same degree of due process as it
would while trying the case in the United States. Therefore, in assessing
whether a system’s procedures are compatible with due process when there has
been a previous FNC dismissal, the court should only look to the nature of the
foreign system, as the Ashenden court did, rather than looking to the
underlying claim, as the Telkinoff court did.
Furthermore, absent some unforeseeable and fundamental change to the
legal landscape, a defendant should be judicially estopped from arguing that a
foreign system’s procedures are incompatible with due process when the
defendant argued otherwise in an FNC proceeding. The Supreme Court
described the doctrine of judicial estoppel’s uniformly recognized purpose as
being “‘to protect the integrity of the judicial process’” through preventing
233
234

Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1326–27 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. at 1327–35.
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parties from deliberately switching positions to gain a legal advantage.235 Thus,
under this line of reasoning, a corporate defendant would be prohibited from
claiming that a foreign tribunal’s procedures were incompatible with due
process where it had previously argued in the United States that the foreign
tribunal’s procedures were adequate during an FNC proceeding. Application of
the doctrine in this context would fulfill the doctrine’s purpose by protecting
the integrity of the judicial process and preventing inconsistent court
decisions.236
As previously discussed, there are many issues with applying the doctrine
of judicial estoppel in the context of an enforcement proceeding because a U.S.
court can easily find occurrences that have “altered the legal landscape” when
a corporate defendant drags a trial out for many years.237 Additionally, the
plaintiffs in the enforcement proceeding are not always the same plaintiffs that
obtained the FNC dismissal when a corporation’s negligence has injured many
in a foreign country, and courts will often find the doctrine inapplicable as a
result.238 However, if the court in the enforcement proceeding is only permitted
to evaluate the foreign system generally, rather than evaluating the underlying
claim as the Osorio and Telkinoff courts did, it may help raise the bar for what
constitutes an occurrence altering the legal landscape and further help prevent
a U.S. court from passing judgment on the laws of other countries.239
235 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001) (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690
F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)). The Court listed several factors for determining whether the doctrine of judicial
estoppel should be applied:

First, a party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier position. Second,
courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that
party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later
proceeding would create “the perception that either the first or the second court was misled.”
. . . A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would
derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.
Id. at 750–51 (citations omitted).
236 Id. at 749–50.
237 See supra Part II.C.
238 E.g., Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1343–44 (finding, among other reasons, that “[d]efendants were not
estopped from challenging the validity of Nicaraguan judgments based on their forum non conveniens position
in the Delgado litigation because the plaintiffs in Delgado and Osorio are different”).
239 Another potential issue with the application of judicial estoppel in this context is that a court could find
a defendant’s previous argument that the foreign system was adequate to be not “clearly inconsistent” with the
argument that its procedures are incompatible with due process because the U.S. Supreme Court in Piper
Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), stated the requirement of an adequate alternative forum is ordinarily
satisfied when “the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ in the other jurisdiction.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at
255 n.22 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–07 (1947)). However, when a defendant argues
against a plaintiff’s assertions that the alternative forum is not impartial during an FNC proceeding, such as
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Furthermore, a court could apply principles from the doctrine of offensive
non-mutual collateral estoppel240 when the plaintiffs in the enforcement
proceedings differ from the plaintiffs in the FNC-dismissal proceedings.
Everyone can agree that encouraging all injured plaintiffs to first bring suit in
the United States, where there has previously been an FNC dismissal on the
same cause of action, before bringing suit in the foreign tribunal would waste
substantial amounts of time, plaintiffs’ money, and judicial resources. As a
result, it seems counterintuitive to punish those plaintiffs, who heeded the
advice of U.S. courts by bringing the suit in the foreign tribunal rather than the
United States, through allowing corporate defendants to take legal positions
that are inconsistent with their FNC position. Through applying principles of
offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel where a plaintiff asserts the doctrine
of judicial estoppel, defendants would be prevented from relitigating issues of
fact already litigated by the defendants in the FNC proceeding, saving judicial
resources and encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit in the alternative foreign
tribunal where there is a previous FNC dismissal.
While it is undesirable to pass judgment on the laws of foreign countries, it
is also undesirable to leave U.S. defendants vulnerable to discriminatory or
disparate treatment by foreign courts. For example, the plaintiffs in Osorio
attempted to enforce a Nicaraguan judgment of $97.4 million.241 Upon
evaluating the damage provisions of Special Law 364, the law passed
specifically to handle the DBCP litigation after the FNC dismissal in Delgado,
the Osorio court found that the damages provided under the law were so
disproportionate to the damages typically awarded in Nicaraguan litigation that
it was unreasonably discriminatory to foreign defendants.242 On the one hand,
not only does such disparate and discriminatory treatment of a defendant
violate notions of due process—even under Posner’s relaxed definition of
international due process—such treatment would also likely violate a state’s
public policy, one of the six, non-mandatory grounds for non-recognition
under UFMJRA. But, on the other hand, it is arguably understandable, if not
ChevronTexaco did in Aguinda, a court should be able to find that asserting otherwise during an enforcement
proceeding is “clearly inconsistent” with the defendant’s previous position.
240 Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, precludes a defendant from asserting claims during
case two that have been previously adjudicated in case one. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 464 (2006).
Traditionally, issue preclusion required mutuality of parties, meaning that the party asserting issue preclusion
must have been a party to case one. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1097 (1997). However, there is a clear trend in
favor of permitting the use of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
241 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
242 Id. at 1337–38.
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foreseeable, that a foreign country would pass laws favoring its own citizens
and discriminating against corporate defendants in the aftermath of corporate
negligence and a U.S. court’s refusal to hear cases on the matter.
One way that a U.S. court can temper the danger of abuse without
completely throwing out a foreign tribunal’s efforts altogether would be to
apply principles emanating from the doctrine of remittitur. Remittitur is a
doctrine long used by trial courts to reduce an award of damages by a jury—
conditioned on plaintiff’s acceptance of the lower award amount—where the
court finds it to be excessive and otherwise require a new trial.243 In other
words, remittitur is said to be appropriate “‘where the verdict is so large as to
shock the conscience of the court.’”244 While it requires the plaintiff to agree to
the decreased judgment amount, it has the advantage of avoiding the expense
and time commitment of a new trial.245
Through applying the principles upon which remittitur is based, an
enforcing court would be willing to recognize a judgment that “shock[s] the
conscience of the court,”246 and thus violates public policy, as long as the
judgment-creditor would agree to a reduction removing the portion offending
public policy. The reduction of the judgment is possible, even though such a
reduction would not be in the interstate setting, because foreign-country
judgments do not merge. Due to there being no merger between the claim and
the judgment, the enforcing court is able to examine the claim underlying the
foreign country judgment, enabling it to remove the offensive portions. While
it would be an adjustment from traditional applications of remittitur, it
similarly avoids the expense of a new trial and provides the added benefit of
protecting corporate defendants from discriminatory foreign court practices.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs would have no legitimate cause for complaint
because the judgment size reduction would require the consent of the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
U.S. corporations’ activities abroad significantly impact foreign
communities, and few regulations exist to curtail their behavior. As a result,
adjudication, and subsequent liability, is often the only way to deter
243 11 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 2815 (2d ed. 1995).
244 Id. (quoting Abrams v. Lightolier, 841 F. Supp. 584, 593 (D.N.J. 1994)).
245 Id.
246 Id.

AND
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corporations from negatively affecting human health and the environment
while capitalizing on foreign markets. Nonetheless, it appears that current
transnational tort litigation often fails to foot the bill for holding corporations
accountable in light of the available tactics corporate defendants employ
during litigation. While much of the blame for this has previously been focused
on the doctrine of FNC, the current foreign-country judgment-enforcement
scheme in the United States is also at fault because it supplies corporate
defendants with a backup plan that rewards evasive and time-consuming
litigation tactics. The UFMJRA was designed to provide uniformity and
consistency to U.S. judgment enforcement. Nonetheless, its three mandatory
and six discretionary defenses to enforcement in the United States provide
corporate defendants with an outline for manufacturing litigation abroad so
that any foreign country judgment rendered against them will never be
enforced against their assets in the United States. As a result, regardless of the
efforts put forth in the foreign proceedings by both foreign plaintiffs and the
foreign tribunal, judgment-enforcement defenses are being used by corporate
defendants as a loophole to accountability, and foreign plaintiffs are deprived
of ever being compensated for injuries caused by corporate malfeasance.
Chevron’s current litigation strategy to avoid liability for Texaco’s role in
the Amazon Chernobyl exemplifies the many issues resulting from the
enforcement loophole. Under this Comment’s proposal, in the event that the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs reach the enforcement stage in the United States, a U.S.
court would only evaluate the nature of Ecuador’s judicial system, as opposed
to the underlying claims, in determining whether the Ecuadorian judgment
satisfies one of the three mandatory and six discretionary defenses to
enforcement. Given that the Aguinda court, in dismissing the case under FNC,
determined that the Ecuadorian tribunal comported with the minimum level of
due process required and passed on a significant burden to Ecuador that has
spanned the last eight years, the issue of Ecuador’s judicial system’s adequacy
under the first mandatory exception is res judicata. In addition, Chevron would
be judicially estopped from claiming that Ecuador’s procedures during the
Lago Agrio litigation were incompatible with due process because it had
previously argued in Aguinda that Ecuador’s procedures were adequate in
response to the plaintiffs’ several objections to the adequacy of Ecuador’s
judicial system.247

247 Brief for Appellee at 39, Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 20027756) (claiming that Ecuador provided an adequate alternative forum).
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It is possible that a court could find some unforeseeable occurrence has
changed the Ecuadorian judiciary’s landscape since the FNC dismissal in 2001.
Nonetheless, the U.S. enforcing court should employ the same degree of
hesitancy as it does in the FNC-dismissal stage for evaluating a foreign
country’s judicial system. Furthermore, in the event that the ultimate
Ecuadorian judgment “shocks the conscience” of the U.S. enforcing court and
violates the state’s public policy, the enforcing court could apply principles of
remittitur to remove the offensive portions of the judgment, subject to
agreement by the plaintiffs, and avoid throwing out the significant judicial
resources expended by enforcing the reduced judgment.
BP’s behavior in the Gulf of Mexico highlights the necessity of holding
corporations accountable for behavior that is reckless and inept regarding life
and the environment. Applying this Comment’s proposal is not only beneficial
because it attempts to hold corporations accountable, but also because it has
the potential to solve many of the concerns raised by an FNC dismissal. Under
current judgment-enforcement scheme of the United States, the enforcement
loophole is a corporate defendant’s safety net when all other evasive litigation
tactics fail: by providing broad exceptions to enforcement, it encourages
corporate defendants to drag transnational litigation out for years after
receiving an FNC dismissal, and, in the rare event that foreign plaintiffs do not
first run out of money or give up, it enables corporate defendants to use the
U.S. judicial system as a last resort for avoiding foreign-country judgments. In
order to prevent corporate defendants’ misuse of judgment enforcement and
preserve the integrity of the U.S. judicial system where there has been a
previous FNC dismissal, this Comment’s proposal to promote enforcement of
the foreign-country judgment is the necessary key because it avoids
inconsistent court decisions and passing judgment on another country’s
tribunals, while holding corporations accountable for their behavior.
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